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Abstract
Background: To strengthen health systems, the shortage of physicians globally needs to be addressed. However,
efforts to increase the numbers of physicians must be balanced with controls on medical education imparted and the
professionalism of doctors licensed to practise medicine.
Methods: We conducted a multi-country comparison of mandatory regulations and voluntary guidelines to control
standards for medical education, clinical training, licensing and re-licensing of doctors. We purposively selected seven
case-study countries with differing health systems and income levels: Canada, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, UK and USA.
Using an analytical framework to assess regulations at four sequential stages of the medical education to relicens‑
ing pathway, we extracted information from: systematically collected scientific and grey literature and online news
articles, websites of regulatory bodies in study countries, and standardised input from researchers and medical profes‑
sionals familiar with rules in the study countries.
Results: The strictest controls we identified to reduce variations in medical training, licensing and re-licensing of
doctors between different medical colleges, and across different regions within a country, include: medical educa‑
tion delivery restricted to public sector institutions; uniform, national examinations for medical college admission and
licensing; and standardised national requirements for relicensing linked to demonstration of competence. However,
countries analysed used different combinations of controls, balancing the strictness of controls across the four stages.
Conclusions: While there is no gold standard model for medical education and practise regulation, examining the
combinations of controls used in different countries enables identification of innovations and regulatory approaches
to address specific contextual challenges, such as decentralisation of regulations to sub-national bodies or privatisa‑
tion of medical education. Looking at the full continuum from medical education to licensing is valuable to under‑
stand how countries balance the strictness of controls at different stages. Further research is needed to understand
how regulating authorities, policy-makers and medical associations can find the right balance of standardisation and
context-based flexibility to produce well-rounded physicians.
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Introduction
Addressing the shortage of healthcare providers—which
is essential for improving health worldwide—poses a
conundrum for health policy-makers. There is an urgent
need to train more healthcare providers to address the
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estimated needs-based shortfall of 17.4 million globally [1]. At the same time, there is a growing body of literature raising concerns about insufficient attention to
minimum standards of professional education and licensing, and the professionalism of healthcare providers as
a result [2–5]. Whilst the number of medical doctors in
the health workforce is growing globally by more than
400,000 every year, variation in the level of professionalism—which includes technical competence, clinical skills
and ethical conduct—is huge [3, 4, 6]. Serious systemic
issues underlying this variation are illustrated by reports
of the explosive growth of for-profit medical colleges
with low teaching and examination standards, impersonation fraud used in medical college entrance exams, and
bribery as a route into some medical colleges [7–12].
In this paper, we focus on regulation across the full
professional development continuum from medical education and clinical training, to physician licensing and
re-licensing. We examine the types of controls in place
to ensure a minimum standard of professionalism among
licensed doctors, recognising that controls along this
continuum may influence the ultimate quality of care that

Fig. 1 Analytical framework
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they provide [13]. There is clear evidence that insufficient
control on standards of medical education, training and
licensing warrants attention as it allows large variations
in class sizes, examination procedures, core curricula
and basic clinical competence within the same country
[14–17]. Yet there is a gap in the literature, particularly
with respect to studies that consider the intersection of
medical education and workforce regulation policy [13,
18]; most studies look at specific processes in isolation,
such as licensing or continuing medical education (CME)
[19, 20], rather than the combination of controls applied
across the professional development continuum.
Analytical framework and objectives

We developed the analytical framework presented in
Fig. 1 to guide our analysis. It outlines four stages—
from admission in medical college to licensing and
re-licensing—at which regulatory controls can act. It
also emphasises that contextual factors can influence
the type of regulatory approach. The framework was
designed based on a review of seminal literature on the
quality of medical care and medical education [4, 5, 21,
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22], and the division of medical education components
proposed by Zhu et al. [23]. The four stages reflect factors affecting the quality of the health workforce as
described by Burdick and Dhillon [13], including who is
chosen to enter the profession (Stage 1), how and what
they are taught (Stage 2), how they are determined to
be qualified (Stages 2 and 3), and how they maintain
and update their skills (Stage 4).
Since terminology varies across countries, we refer to
medical degree administering institutions as ‘medical
colleges’ and to the period of clinical training between
graduation from medical college and licensing as ‘clinical
training’.
The literature indicates that there is a multiplicity of
regulatory tools and approaches available at each of the
four stages, depending on the country and/or regional
context. Studies of regulatory regimes repeatedly refer to
a mix of approaches, with little consistency across different country contexts [19, 24, 25], and there is no agreement on which regulatory approaches might be most
effective in ensuring professionalism. Indeed, no model
emerges as ‘gold standard’ for regulation that is applicable across diverse contexts [19, 25]. For instance, there
is no ideal approach to determining the frequency of
re-licensing (stage 4 on our framework) and the modalities and frequency of CME. The most commonly used
standards, from the World Federation of Medical Education, cover basic medical education, post-graduate medical education and continuing professional development
[26]. The standards do not cover licensing, nor are they
prescriptive. As stated by the World Federation of Medical Education, their standards are intended to provide a
framework for educational institutions and accrediting
agencies to develop and evaluate medical education as
appropriate for the context [27].

In light of the lack of research looking at the entire continuum from medical education and training to licensing and re-licensing, and comparing approaches used
across diverse contexts, our study examines how different national and sub-national agencies apply the various
available regulatory controls to different stages in this
continuum. We discuss possible implications of different
regulatory approaches applied and seek to identify innovations in models of regulation that could be useful to
learn from.

Methods
In line with our analytical framework, we purposively
selected seven countries from North America, Europe
and Asia. We limited our scope to geographical regions
where the research team had expertise and connections
owing to the need for extensive validation of information
by local experts. Within these regions, we selected countries that differed on key attributes that could underpin
variations in the types and quality of regulations. These
attributes included: (i) gross national income (as classified by the World Bank) [28]; (ii) whether regulations
relating to medical education and licensing were controlled by national or sub-national authorities; and (iii)
extent of private sector presence in medical education
(Table 1).
Focusing on regulations and guidelines that relate to
the four stages in our analytical framework within each
country, we collected information from three sources:
websites of relevant regulating bodies in each country
(such as national medical councils), a systematic search
for scientific and grey literature and news articles published online, and written input from 1–2 medically
qualified researchers or medical professionals with lived
experience and knowledge of each of following countries:

Table 1 Overview of case-study countries [74, 75]
Indicator

World Bank income classifica‑
tion

Country
Canada

China

India

Iran

Pakistan

High

Upper middle Lower middle Upper middle Lower middle

UK

USA

High

High

Population size (2019)

38 million

1.4 billion

1.3 billion

83 million

217 million

67 million 328 million

General government
expenditure on health as a
percentage of total govern‑
ment expenditure (2018)

20%

9%

3%

22%

5%

19%

23%

Physicians per 1000 popula‑
tion (2018/19)

2.8

2.0

0.8

1.6

1.0

3.0

2.6

Regulation of medical educa‑
tion and licencing led by
national authorities or subnational authorities?

Sub-national Sub-national

Sub-national

National

Licencing by national body;
medical education by subnational

National

Sub-national
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China, India, Iran, and Pakistan. For the latter, we used
standardised questions that solicited information about
each of the stages in our analytical framework. Our systematic search methodology is summarised in the appendix (Appendix 1). Information from these three sources
was analysed by following three steps. First, we extracted
relevant information about each country using an MS
Excel-based template with sections mirroring our analytical framework. Second, we examined the standardised
information collected about processes and regulations in
each study country individually, from stages one to four
in the framework. Third, we summarised the information
at key steps into either yes/no answers for the presence of
a regulation, or into years (of study), to allow cross-country comparisons.

Results
Table 2 presents a summary of our comparative analysis, and below we synthesise the key findings using subheadings that correspond to the stages in our analytical
framework. Some overarching differences are summarised here.
First, we identify large variation in the (usual) number of years of education between completing secondary
schooling and being licensed to practise medicine ranging from five and a half years in India to 11 years in the
USA. Part of this difference relates to the usual requirement in the USA and Canada to complete a 3 to 4-year
undergraduate degree before entering into medical college. Additional training for specialisation varies according to the field and is outside the scope of our analysis.
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Apart from the UK and Canada, all other countries we
analysed allow medical education to be delivered by both
public and private medical colleges, although the dominance of private medical education and approaches used
to regulate private medical education vary. In Iran, private medical education is typically nested within some of
the highest ranking and well-resourced public universities, where students who can afford the fees can receive
medical education despite having lower examination
scores [29]. These medical colleges also offer education
to overseas students, comprised of an initial component in English for the first two to three years, followed
by clinical training in Farsi alongside the rest of medical
students. In both Pakistan and India, there are now substantially more private than public medical colleges [30,
31], and the medical education and licensing regulators
are currently undergoing reforms, after decades. India
has introduced the 2019 National Medical Commission
(NMC) Bill, which is in the process of implementation,
and in Pakistan, a new regulating authority—the Pakistan
Medical Commission (PMC) (has been established [32,
33].
Stage 1: medical college admission

For the countries we analysed, standards for entry into
medical education are regulated in three ways: through
identical entrance tests to all public and private medical colleges administered by external agencies (USA,
UK, and Canada) (Box 1); through standardised tests
which are not specific to medical colleges but are used
by all undergraduate colleges across the country as part

Table 2 Comparison of regulations for medical education, clinical training, licensing and re-licensing across the four stages of the
analytical framework and across the case-study countries
Stage Regulations

Can

China India Iran Pak UK USA

N/A

Are private (for-profit) medical colleges allowed?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No Yes

1

Is there a uniform examination that all students undertake for admission to medical col‑
lege?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes Yes

2

Is there a uniform examination for acquiring a medical degree?

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No Yes

2

Is medical training offered at the undergraduate level/ without first degree?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes No

2,3

Total years of medical education and clinical training (after school) to be eligible for medi‑
cal licence

9–10 8

5.5

7

6

7

3

Is there a national licensing exam?

Yes

Noa

No

Noa No Yes

Yes
b

11

4

Is license renewal by an independent body required across the country

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes Yes

4

After how many years is licensing renewal required, if at all?

1

N/A

5c

5

2

5

4

Does permission to continue medical practise require CME or demonstration of clinical
competencies?

Yes

Yesb

Yesc

Yes

No

Yes Yes,
except
in 1
state

a

Introduced in 2021 (Pakistan) and 2022 (India)

b

Physicians have to pass a competency test every two years to continue to practise even though licence renewal is not required

c

Only applies to nine states that have mandatory relicensing

1–4
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of the admissions decisions, whether public or private
(China and Iran); and through admission tests which
are not standardised across the country and are instead
determined by the state/province (in the case of public
colleges) or the medical college itself (in the case of private colleges) (in Pakistan and India prior to the ongoing
reforms).
Even when there are stronger controls, through identical or standardised tests, it is often the case that the toptier medical colleges will only accept students with high
testing scores, whilst some private medical colleges will
accept students with weaker scores. For example, when
it comes to overseas students, the entry requirements for
medical colleges in Iran vary depending on the college
and are typically less rigorous. Similarly, in China, admission decisions for overseas students are managed by the
college. Changes to medical college admissions rules are
highly political. In Pakistan, while a uniform admission
test is necessary to enter all private and public medical
colleges from 2021 onwards, there are ongoing disputes
about whether private colleges are at liberty to decide
what weighting to give to the entrance exam results in
admission decisions [34]. To centralise and standardise admissions procedures nationwide, the Indian union
government introduced the National Eligibility Cum
Entrance Test for admission into all medical and dental
programmes in 2012. This was ruled unconstitutional
from 2013 to 2016 and is now reinstated as the sole
admission criterion under the NMC Bill 2019 [35].
Box 1: Medical college admissions

Examination specific for students applying to medical
colleges
Canada—Medical College Admissions Test (except
Quebec).
India—National Eligibility Entrance Test.
Pakistan—Medical and Dental College Admissions
Test.
UK—UK Clinical Aptitude Test or BioMedical
Admissions Test.
USA—Medical College Admissions Test.
Examination for all undergraduate education
China—National College Entrance Examination
(Gaokao).
Iran—Iranian University Entrance Exam (Konkour).
Stage 2: medical curriculum and examination

The USA, UK, Iran and Canada have standardised medical education curricula and qualifying examinations for
receiving a medical degree that are overseen by thirdparty governing bodies, enabling relatively strict controls
over standards for graduating doctors [36–41]. The USA,
Iran and Canada have multi-part examinations which
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are identical for all students in all medical colleges. In
Iran, all medical students are required to take uniform,
standardised examinations twice during medical college:
basic sciences in the third year and a clinical knowledge
assessment in the fifth or sixth year. All students additionally take a clinical competency examination focusing
on practical skills in their final year prior to receiving the
diploma. The UK has weaker controls at the examination
stage; medical examinations are reviewed to meet assessment standards, but vary from college to college [42].
However, a new examination for all UK medical colleges,
the Medical Licensing Assessment, will begin in 2024
[43].
In China, the curricula covered and teaching materials used may vary slightly between medical colleges,
depending on additional teaching materials colleges
select to complement standardised textbooks, although
the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health have
clear guidelines on this [44]. Although qualifying examinations administered by each medical college can differ,
the National Medical Licensing Examination is the same
across the country.
In Pakistan, there are guidelines on the minimum content required in each of the compulsory subjects in medical colleges, but no enforced regulation. Pakistan has no
standardised examination to receive a medical degree,
although a National Licensing Exam has been introduced
which is planned to be implemented from 2021. Under
the NMC Bill 2019, India is shifting to a competency
based undergraduate curriculum that applies to public and private medical colleges, and is overseen by the
newly introduced NMC [45]. It is also introducing a twopart National Exit Test, which should be in place by 2022,
and will be a requirement for entry into postgraduate
training and registration in the state and national registers [46]. In recent years, however, qualifying examinations have varied across colleges in Pakistan and India,
such that it can be easier to receive a nationally recognised medical degree from some colleges.
Stage 3: clinical training and licensing

A medical licence permits a person to legally practise
medicine, and all countries have a method of licensing medical doctors following completion of mandatory
clinical training. The latter typically involves the graduate
doctor conducting clinical work under the supervision of
a licensed clinician.
The USA and China have the longest durations of clinical training (3 years) which must be completed in a government approved facility. Following clinical training in
the USA, a licence is granted after completing the threestep licensing exam [3]. China’s standardised residency
training, which has been mandatory from 2020, is divided
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into two-and-a-half years of hospital-based training and
6 months in a community healthcare facility [47]. This is
followed by an assessment to obtain a certificate of completion of residency training, which is recognised nationwide [48]. Doctors need two certificates to be licensed
to practise medicine in China. To receive the Medical
Practitioner’s Qualification Certificate, graduates must
pass the National Medical Licensing Examination and
complete postgraduate training. The Physician’s Practice
License is obtained after joining a specific medical facility and needs to be re-applied for if the doctor moves to
another place of work.
The UK and Canada require two years of clinical training in government-funded and accredited hospitals.
Proof of completion of two years of clinical training is
required for licensing, and further specialty training is
often undertaken [43, 49].
In Iran, there are some differences depending on
whether the student intends to practise inside or outside of Iran. All students go through 18 months of clinical training (internship) prior to official graduation. In
their role as interns, they provide essential services at
the Ministry of Health-affiliated teaching hospitals under
the supervision of licensed physicians and residents.
After completing medical college and the clinical training period, a licence to practise is issued following a paid
mandatory government service provided to areas with
a shortage of physicians, mainly rural or low-resource
areas, taking between 14 to 24 months [50]. Overseas
students are not required to do the mandatory rural area
service post-graduation if they intend to practise outside
of Iran.
Pakistan and India have the shortest clinical training
periods of 12 months. Such training is mandatory for
receiving a licence and this must be based in a recognised
teaching institution. In India, six months are reserved for
rural or community health facilities [51, 52]. Mechanisms
to check and enforce minimum standards of supervision
and clinical training in teaching hospitals, such as accreditation or audits by external agencies, are not used uniformly yet.
Stage 4: re‑licensing

Rules on medical licence renewal and CME across the
seven countries can be broadly categorised as: mandatory licence renewal tied to CME or demonstration of
some competencies (most states in USA, Canada, UK,
and Iran), licence renewal mandatory but only requires
payment of a fee under the PMDC rules (Pakistan) and
no requirement for licence renewal by an independent body (China and majority of states in India) [40, 53,
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54]. Although there is no expiration date for the Medical Practitioner’s qualification certificate in China, CME
is compulsory, as is passing a performance assessment
supervised by the local health departments every 2 years;
doctors who fail are suspended from practising for
3–6 months until they pass the assessment [55]. There are
also assessments conducted by government health facilities, which means that CME is tied to the doctors’ career
progression, but variation in assessment standards is possible [20]. Whilst CME completion for doctors working
in government health facilities is high, the enforcement
of CME regulations and performance assessments on the
relatively small proportion of doctors working solely in
private clinics is not clear [47].
In the USA, whilst all states require re-licensing, the
specific requirements for renewal varies by state. Only
one state (Montana) has no CME requirement for medical doctors to maintain their medical licences [56, 57].
Although the Medical Council of India made a mandatory resolution in 2011 requiring doctors to attend
minimum of 30 h of CME every five years to ensure reregistration, only nine of 26 State Medical Councils have
made re-registration for licence renewal mandatory [58];
therefore only about 20% of India’s doctors follow CME
rules, as they are not legally required in the states in
which they work [20, 59]. In Pakistan, registration needs
to be renewed every two years; licence renewal does not,
however, require any additional assessments or CME,
only payment of a fee, but this may change under the new
PMC [14].

Discussion
Our analysis shows that there are wide variations in the
controls that are employed by countries to regulate medical education, clinical training and physician licensing
and re-licensing, and that there is value in analysing the
entire continuum, as we do in this study, because strong
controls at one stage are often balanced with less strict
controls at other stages. Based on our findings and in
line with what others have reported, we would propose
it is not practical or desirable to provide a gold standard
of regulatory approaches to be applied across different
contexts, and that the strictest controls may not always
be appropriate [19, 25, 60]. In addition, conceptualising
regulatory controls as operating on a continuum—from
medical college admission to relicensing and continued
professional development—rather than as discrete controls independent of checks at other stages, opens up a
broader set of regulatory options and offers more flexibility based on what is required or feasible at different stages. For example, if there is a strongly enforced
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minimum standard for medical school graduates, this
may reduce the need for an additional nationally standardised examination at the admission to medical college
stage.
Indeed, the development of a gold standard for regulation of medical education, clinical training, licensing and
relicensing risks producing a one-size-fits-all approach
that is excessively reliant on Western approaches [61].
We therefore focused instead on drawing lessons through
a comparison of models used by different countries,
highlighting specific considerations about controls that
can be used at each stage of our analytical framework,
and discussing how contextual factors might influence
decisions on appropriate controls to use.
Considering the first stage of our framework, medical
college admission, we note that although having uniform
admission examinations across all colleges is a control
often used to standardise the competencies of admitted candidates, allowing colleges the freedom to select
candidates without a mandatory minimum score dilutes
the effect of this attempt at standardisation resulting in
variable enrolment standards even in countries with uniform admission examinations. For example, a study from
China showed that private medical colleges often require
lower scores than public colleges [62]. An advantage
of having uniform examinations linked to a minimum
score for admission is that it prevents profit-making colleges from lowering standards to allow fee-paying students without sufficient competence to be admitted.
A uniform national standard of competence required
at the graduation and/or licensing stage can also help
to ensure that variations in admission standards do not
adversely impact levels of professionalism among practising doctors. However, there may be value in some medical schools allowing lower admissions scores in contexts
where there is large sub-national variation in education
standards or under-representation of specific groups in
the medical profession. Less emphasis on examination
scores in admissions decisions may also reflect a growing realisation that other skills, such as strong communication and ability to collaborate, is worth considering
in addition to academic achievements [63, 64]. Alternatively, minimum admissions standards for medical colleges may be an incentive for the providers of primary
and secondary education in less-developed regions to
improve the quality of education.
In relation to stages two and three in our framework,
we found that all three countries (UK, Pakistan and India)
that do not have uniform licensing examinations are currently in the processes of introducing these as a tool to
control variations in standards. In Canada, where physicians are licensed by provincial authorities to practise
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in their jurisdiction, calls have been made to create a
national license for physicians to standardise licensing
across provinces so that it is easier to redistribute physician workforce and reduce gaps in physician coverage
[65]. Clinical training in a teaching hospital is mandatory prior to licensing in all countries, but the quality of
this training depends on the training institution within
which graduate doctors are embedded and the supervision received; this is difficult to monitor and subject to
variable levels of controls. For example, there is evidence
of private medical colleges that are not linked to appropriate teaching hospitals and clinical laboratories compromising the quality of mandatory clinical training [66].
As the number of medical colleges grow in a country, it is
important to ensure that each one is linked to an appropriate teaching hospital where graduates can receive
high quality clinical training. Regulations on the minimum years that an accredited teaching hospital has been
running for, and on essential medical departments that
teaching hospitals must have, may be useful here [67].
With respect to the final re-licensing stage of our
framework, we found that substantial variations in relicensing requirements across a country occurred when
sub-national rather than national authorities are responsible for setting rules (for example, in India and USA).
In the USA, the states of Indiana and New York only
require “opioid prescribing and opioid abuse” training
as part of their mandatory CME, and Montana does not
require any CME for re-licensing, but all others do. We
also found that licensing can be de-linked from CME
requirements or demonstration of knowledge or skills (in
Pakistan and Montana state, in the USA). Both of these
situations make it possible for doctors to legally practise
for decades after initial licensing, without any check on
their continuing clinical competence. In another model
de-linking re-licensing and competence, in China, relicensing is not required but physicians need to demonstrate adequate competency in an exam every two years
to continue to practise. An unusually lax model exists in
all except nine states of India [68], where physicians do
not require any re-licensing by an independent regulator
to continue to practise after acquiring the initial licence.
Whether physician competencies can be reliably maintained in systems without mandatory assessments to
allow continued medical practise, and whether controls
at other points help to maintain professional standards
is a relevant question. Presence of such highly variable
approaches to relicensing within sub-national entities of
the same country, such as in India and the US, highlights
the fact that there is little evidence on the effectiveness
of various models in maintaining physician competencies and to guide policy choices. Such divergent models
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operating in the same country provide an opportunity
to study their comparative effectiveness and strengths or
weaknesses as regulatory models to maintain physician
competence.
Although inadequate controls on the quality of medical education and clinical training is a challenge to
address in both public and private sector institutions,
the profit-making business model of private medical
colleges introduces specific complexities with respect
to regulation [4]. A comparison across our case-study
countries was insightful here as we could identify three
approaches to regulating (private) medical education:
retaining medical education in the public sector (UK,
Canada); having uniform minimum entry criteria and
licensing examinations that apply to public and private
colleges (China and USA); and an innovative approach
of embedding private sector colleges within public
universities (Iran). Pakistan and India are currently
changing their regulations, aiming to move towards
the second approach.
While investing in public sector medical education
and retaining all or most medical education in the
public sector has many advantages, and can reduce the
layers of controls needed, private medical education is
often encouraged because it allows injection of private
capital into medical education to increase the number
of doctors without government investment [4, 69]. The
USA shows that relatively strong controls on medical
education are possible despite having a large and powerful private medical education sector. In countries
where regulatory authorities have not strengthened at
the pace at which the private medical education sector has grown, however, challenges in regulation can
occur. In India and Pakistan, private medical colleges
have mushroomed in the last two decades, but with
increasingly lax regulations because the rapid private
medical college expansion has outstripped the capacity
of regulatory systems. It is important for countries to
be cognisant of becoming trapped in a cycle in which
weak regulations on minimum standards for faculty
and infrastructure, and on profit-making, allows the
number of highly profitable medical colleges to grow
rapidly, and potentially enables the powerful private
sector to engage in lobbying or co-opting the regulatory process to weaken regulatory controls [70].
Suggested approaches include creation of dedicated
departments of medical education in private colleges,
relying on system of accreditation and enhancing the
capacity and powers of regulatory bodies [15, 71].
Although our comparative analysis of regulations
and guidelines yielded some important insights, we
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acknowledge limitations of our study scope; for example, we do not consider rules relating to foreign medical graduates or compare teaching methods. Another
limitation is that we focused on regulations as written
(de jure), regardless of whether the practice is implemented in reality (de facto). Further study on the
strength of regulatory bodies in different countries,
involving primary qualitative research with regulators,
and on the relationship between regulatory controls
at various stages of medical education and clinical
competence assurance of practising doctors would be
useful.

Conclusions
Doctors typically hold a position of power and are
trusted by patients because of the uncertainty, informational asymmetry, and buyer vulnerability that
characterise medical consultations [72, 73]. The professionalism of doctors, and the measures put in place
by relevant authorities to ensure their professionalism, are, therefore, paramount. While there is no gold
standard model for medical education and practise
regulation—even among high-income countries that
are perceived as leaders in this area—examining the
combinations of controls used in different countries
enables identification of innovations and of regulatory
approaches that have been used to address specific contextual challenges, such as decentralisation of regulations to sub-national bodies or privatisation of medical
education. Our study highlights the value in looking
across the full continuum of professional development
from who is allowed to enter the medical education,
what students are taught, how they are determined to
be qualified to practise medicine and how they must
maintain and update their skills; using our analytical
framework to examine the full continuum showed that
countries may balance having weaker controls at one
stage with stricter controls at an earlier or later stage.
Finally, whilst we identified a shift towards introduction of stronger regulatory controls, such as a national
licensing examination in countries that do not have
this yet, we emphasise that further work is needed to
understand how regulating authorities, policy-makers
and medical associations can find the right balance
of standardisation and context-based flexibility, and
between students’ theoretical, and ethical and practical
skills.
Appendix 1
See Table 3.
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Table 3 Systematic search strategy
Search platform

Google (UK)

Search date

15 September 2020

Search terms

Country name + Regulation* + one of the terms
below:
Medical Education
Medical education entrance exam*
Medical education curriculum
Medical education exam*
Medical degree exam*
Medical license*
Medical postgraduate training
Continuing medical education

Review process

Review first 10 results for each search combination
[56 searches in total]

Abbreviations
CME: Continued medical education; NMC: National Medical Commission; PMC:
Pakistan Medical Commission; SRT: Standardised residency training.
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